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The Volcker Rule: Clarifying the Anti-Evasion
Provision to Facilitate Compliance
I. INTRODUCTION
The long-awaited Volcker Rule (“Rule”)1 was fully implemented
on July 21, 2015, five years after being introduced.2 As part of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”),3 which added § 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC
Act”) of 1956,4 the Rule prohibits covered banking entities5 from
engaging in proprietary trading or investing in covered funds.6 The
trading prohibition applies to short-term trading, which is generally
considered as holding a financial instrument for less than sixty days. 7 The
final version of the Rule was released and adopted on April 1, 2014 by

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351 (2015); 17 C.F.R. §§ 75, 255 (2015).
2. Daniel Roberts, Volcker Rule Takes Effect Today After Years Of Delay, FORTUNE
(July 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/volcker-rule/.
3. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851.
4. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (“BHC Act”), H.R. 6227, 84th Cong. (1956).
5. See BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, FINAL VOLCKER RULE REGULATIONS: RESTRICTIONS
ON COVERED FUND ACTIVITIES AND INVESTMENT 3–4 (Jan. 6, 2014) (defining banking entities
as “any insured depository institution; any company that controls an insured depository
institution; any company treated as a bank holding company for purposes of § 8 of the
International Banking Act of 1978; and any affiliate or subsidiary of any of the foregoing
institutions”).
6. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851; 17 C.F.R. § 75 (defining proprietary trading as
“engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity in any purchase or sale
of one or more financial instruments”); see also ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, ADVISORY:
VOLCKER
RULE-FINAL
IMPLEMENTING
RULES
3
(Feb.
2014),
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/ADV214VolckerRuleFinalImplementing
Rules.pdf (defining covered funds as “privately offered funds or pools that either (i) rely on
Section 39(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act for an exemption from that Act
[or] (ii) are commodity pools offered privately in reliance on exemptions in CFTC Rule
4.7 . . . .”).
7. See 17 C.F.R. § 75 (2015) (noting the rebuttable presumption that any purchases or
sales of a financial instrument are considered for a short-term trading account if they are held
for less than 60 days); Hillel T. Cohn, The Volcker Rule Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading:
Considerations for Broker-Dealer Affiliates of Foreign Banking Organizations, THE COLUM.
L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG, (Feb. 3, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/02/03/thevolcker-rule-prohibitions-on-proprietary-trading-considerations-for-broker-dealer-affiliatesof-foreign-banking-organizations/.
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the five agencies (“Regulators”) charged with implementing the Rule
(“Final Implementing Rules”): the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).8 Though the Rule went into effect April 1, 2014,
covered banking entities had until July 21, 2015 (“Compliance Date”), to
fully conform their proprietary trading activities and investments to the
Rule’s requirements.9 However, banking entities have until July 21,
2016, to conform any investments in covered funds and foreign funds that
were in place prior to December 31, 2013.10
Although the Rule bans proprietary trading, it also carves out
limited exceptions for certain purposes (“Permitted Activities”).11 The
Rule and the Final Implementing Rules permit proprietary trading in
conjunction with the following activities: underwriting, market making,
risk-mitigating hedging, trading in domestic government debt, trading on
behalf of customers, and trading by insurance companies.12 These
Permitted Activities do not give banking entities free rein; rather the
Permitted Activities are subject to a set of overriding limitations,
collectively known as the “Prudential Backstops.”13 The Prudential
8. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(i); 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351, 255
(2015); Arnold & Porter LLP, supra note 6.
9. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 1.
10. FRANK A. MAYER, III ET AL., PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, CLIENT ALERT: OBSERVATION
2.0: THE ANTI-EVASION PROVISION OF THE VOLCKER RULE 1 (Jan. 8, 2015),
http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/clientalert010815.pdf.
11. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (2012) (listing the generally permitted
activities); see also Final Rule § ___.3, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781–82 (Jan. 31, 2014) (stating
that a banking entity may not engage as principal in: (1) any purchase or sale of one or more
“financial instruments” (2) for the “trading account” of the banking entity, (3) unless: the
activity is excluded from the definition of “proprietary trading,” or an exemption is available
and its requirements are satisfied) (the text of the Final Rule, which contains the provisions
common to all five Regulators, and its accompanying attachments may be found at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/final-common-rules20131210.pdf).
12. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (2012) (highlighting all permitted
activities and noting that “insurance company” includes those “directly engaged in the
business of insurance for the general account of the company” as well as “any affiliate of such
regulated insurance company”); DANIEL L. GOELZER, BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIENT ALERT:
THE VOLCKER RULE—COMPLIANCE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN BANKING
ENTITIES (Apr. 2014), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/27b69c86-beb14319-ab19-537caeb84a7c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5bd77889-b44d-4c13-9a4d58f27ee56697/al_bf_proprietarytradingprohibition_jan14.pdf).
13. See Final Rule § ____.7(a), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5786–87 (Jan. 31, 2014) (laying out
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Backstops indicate that proprietary trading activities that would
otherwise be permissible—or, fall within an aforementioned exception—
are not appropriate where they would result in “a material conflict of
interest” or “a material exposure . . . to a high-risk asset or high-risk
trading strategy.”14 Activities are also inappropriate where they would
pose a threat either to the “safety and soundness” of a banking entity or
to the “financial stability of the United States.”15
The Prudential Backstops are not insurmountable—banking
entities can overcome these “conflict[s] of interest” by making timely
disclosures to the client prior to engaging in any transactions that may
produce a conflict of interest, or by using information barriers that are
addressed in their written policies.16 A timely disclosure would need to
provide the client with sufficient time to “evaluate and act on the
information.”17 Information barriers could include actual separation of
“personnel or functions,” or certain limitations on types of activity
permitted.18 Despite these mitigating measures, the Prudential Backstops
pose a potential problem given the high-level of subjectivity involved in
determining whether an activity may cause a material conflict of interest,
or, whether it rises to a sufficient level to be considered a threat either to
the safety and soundness of the banking entity or, to the financial stability
of the United States.19
the limitations on permitted proprietary trading exceptions to the Rule); see also SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL LLP, U.S. AGENCIES APPROVE FINAL VOLCKER RULE, DETAILING PROHIBITIONS
AND COMPLIANCE REGIMES APPLICABLE TO BANKING ENTITIES WORLDWIDE 118 (Jan. 27,
2014), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Volcker_Rule.pdf
(noting that these overriding limitations are referred to by Regulators as “prudential
backstops”).
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 619, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1851(d)(2)(A) (2012); GOELZER, supra note 12.
15. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2)(A) (2012); GOELZER, supra note 12.
16. Final Rule § ____.7(b)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781–82 (Jan. 31, 2014); MORRISON
& FOERSTER LLP, A USER’S GUIDE TO THE VOLCKER RULE 12 (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/131223-A-Users-Guide-to-The-VolckerRule.pdf
17. Final Rule § ____.7(b)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781–82 (Jan. 31, 2014); Oliver Ireland
& Daniel Nathan, Bank Supervision: The Volcker Rule’s Trojan Horse for Smaller Banking
Entities? [2014] Banking Daily (BNA) (Apr. 8, 2014).
18. Final Rule § ____.7(b)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781–82 (Jan. 31, 2014); Ireland &
Nathan, supra note 17.
19. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule: Implementation and Impact, CORNELL
UNIV.
L.
SCH.,
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/conferences_and_events/banking/20
14/pdf/cms_volcker_whitehead_2014.pdf (noting the potentially problematic nature of the
Prudential Backstops given the lack of guidance on specific activities that may be likely to
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The Rule’s many proprietary trading exceptions and the
restrictions the Prudential Backstops impose on those exceptions, force
banking entities and Regulators to use what seems to be an excessive
amount of discretion to distinguish between permissible and prohibited
activity.20 Since many activities (e.g., market-making) are permissible
under the Rule’s exceptions,21 banking entities engaging in these
excepted activities will be greatly scrutinized by the Regulators. 22 Indepth scrutiny will ensure that such trading activity is permissible under
the Prudential Backstops.23
Regulators are given even more discretion as a result of the
Prudential Backstops, which may implicate the Rule’s anti-evasion
provision (“Anti-Evasion Provision”).24 The Anti-Evasion Provision
delineates the Regulators’ authority to take action where there is
“reasonable cause to believe that a banking entity” has engaged in activity
that “functions as an evasion of the requirements” of the Rule.25 The
Anti-Evasion Provision grants authority to each of the Regulators to order
any banking entity, after providing appropriate due process and the
opportunity for a hearing, to terminate any activity or dispose of any
investments that functionally evade the requirements or violate the
restrictions set forth in the Rule.26 The Regulators uphold the AntiEvasion Provision using the “reasonable cause” standard—which, is

violate the Backstops).
20. Deloitte, The Final Volcker Rule: 10 Issues for Banks to Consider, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
25, 2014), http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/25/the-final-volcker-rule-10issues-for-banks-to-consider/.
21. GOELZER, supra note 12.
22. See MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2 (indicating that while a banking entity may
be engaging in activity that it genuinely believes is within the permitted exceptions to the ban
on proprietary trading, they could consequently face scrutiny by the Regulators as to whether
such activity does in fact fall within the exceptions).
23. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, VOLCKER RULE INTERIM
EXAMINATION PROCEDURES (June 2014) (discussing examples of the in-depth procedures with
which regulators, such as the OCC, will use to evaluate banking entities’ compliance with the
Rule); see also Whitehead, supra note 19 (noting that one of the potential challenges to the
Prudential Backstops is how to make a clear distinction between prohibited and permissible
activity given differences across firms, difference amongst financial markets, and the potential
for banking entities to mask prohibited activities as permitted activities).
24. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); see infra Part III.
25. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2); see infra Part III.
26. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2); Memorandum by Paul Weiss, The
Volcker
Rule
5
(July
14,
2010);
http://www.paulweiss.com/media/104137/PW14Jul10VR.pdf; see infra Part III.
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simply that the entity’s activity could, or does, function as an evasion. 27
“Reasonable cause” by itself does not set a high bar for enforcement, and
the phrase “functions as an evasion” lowers the bar further by seemingly
indicating that no intent is necessary to violate the Provision. 28
This Note discusses both the Rule’s gaps in adequately
identifying the types of transactions that would implicate the Prudential
Backstops, as well as the ambiguous guidelines for compliance with, and
enforcement of, the Anti-Evasion Provision. Part II lays out how banking
entities are expected to comply with the prohibition against proprietary
trading, and the challenges in identifying activities permitted within the
exceptions.29 Part III addresses the Anti-Evasion Provision and the
enforcement problems it poses to banking entities and Regulators.30 Part
IV discusses potential measures for reforming and clarifying the AntiEvasion Provision by analyzing a similar anti-evasion provision from the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).31 Finally, Part V concludes by
reiterating the importance of clarifying the Anti-Evasion Provision to
facilitate compliance and ensure consistent enforcement of the AntiEvasion Provision.32
II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Prior to the Compliance Date, banking entities had to thoroughly
examine and assess their current trading practices to determine whether,
and how, they were engaging in proprietary trading. 33 Banking entities
mapped out their existing trading activities, covered fund activities, and
investments and compared them to the Rule’s requirements.34 This

27. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); see infra Part III.
28. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); see PHILLIP HOFFMAN & TIMOTHY

R. MCTAGGART, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, CLIENT ALERT: OBSERVATION 3.0: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE VOLCKER RULE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN
BANKS
INVESTING
IN
FOREIGN
FUNDS
Q.14
(Oct.
20,
2015),
http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/clientalert010815.pdf (supporting the notion that an
entity does not need to have intent to evade the Rule, and instead, the activity need only
function like an evasion); see infra Part III.
29. See infra Part II; while the Rule’s prohibitions also extend to investment in covered
fund activities, this Note only addresses the challenges with proprietary trading.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part VI.
33. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 6.
34. Id.
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comparison allowed each entity to create a plan to conform its proprietary
trading activities to the requirements of the Rule, or in the alternative, to
terminate or divest such activity by the Compliance Date.35
The specific compliance requirements vary depending on the size
of the institution.36 Smaller banking entities—those that either do not
have investments in covered funds or have consolidated assets less than
$10 billion—have very limited compliance requirements.37 In fact, those
smaller banking entities, sometimes called the “less active” entities38,
which do not engage in any covered activities—permitted proprietary
trading and investing in hedge funds—are not required to establish a
compliance program unless, or until, they begin engaging in such
activities.39 The smaller banking entities that have consolidated assets
less than $10 billion and who engage in “modest” covered proprietary
trading activities, have the option to incorporate the compliance
requirements of the Final Implementing Rules into their existing
compliance program—they can do this by adjusting their existing
program and appropriately including references to the requirements of the
Final Implementing Rules.40 Banking entities that have more than $10
billion but less than $50 billion in consolidated assets, are required to
adopt the general compliance program set forth by the Final
Implementing Rules41—commonly known as the “six pillars.”42 More
stringent compliance and reporting requirements43—in addition to what
the six pillars require—apply to banking entities that have total

35. Id. at 5–6.
36. Final Rule § ____.20(a), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); ARNOLD &

PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7–9.
37. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7.
38. Final Rule § ____.20(f), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
39. Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17.
40. Final Rule § ____.20(f), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014); Ireland & Nathan,
supra note 17.
41. 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351 (2015); 17 C.F.R. §§ 75, 255 (2015); Final Rule §
____.20(c)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17;
DANIEL L. GOELZER, supra note 12.
42. ANNETE L. NAZARETH ET AL., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, VOLCKER PROP
TRADING PROVISIONS: HOW FIRMS ARE PREPARING 11 (June 15, 2015),
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/2015-0612_Volcker_Prop_Trading_Provisions_How_Firms_Are_Preparing.pdf.
43. See Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17 (indicating that the larger banking entities who
engage in permitted proprietary trading, are to periodically provide the Regulators with
reports regarding seven different quantitative metrics).
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consolidated assets of $50 billion or more.44
As to the first pillar, written policies and procedures, many
entities have taken a three-tiered approach with their structure.45 The first
tier includes a board-level policy, the second tier includes an entity-wide
compliance manual, and the third tier has desk-specific policies and
procedures.46
The second pillar, a system of internal controls, is designed to
track trading activity and monitor for any instances of prohibited
activity.47 A large component of the internal controls system is
determining the processes by which to communicate, internally and to the
Regulators, those situations where prohibited activity has been, or may
have been, identified.48 Each banking entity must also assess the manner
in which the required metrics will be calculated and reported to the
Regulators.49
The third pillar sets out the expectation that banking entities will
arrange their corporate governance in a manner that clearly and
appropriately delegates responsibility and accountability for compliance
with the Rule.50 Banking entities are expected to determine who from
their boards, and senior management, will be responsible for overseeing
the various components of compliance.51 Some of those delegated
responsibilities include, arranging for training on the Rule and identifying
the testing methods to be used for monitoring risky trading activity that

44. Final Rule § ____.20(c)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); see also
Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17 (noting that a foreign entity who has U.S. assets “as of the
previous calendar year end of $50 billion or more” is also subject to increased compliance
requirements). Additional entities may also be otherwise directed by regulators to comply
with the enhanced requirements—these entities are simply notified by the relevant Regulator
that they are to comply with the Enhanced Minimum Standards for Compliance Programs, set
forth in Appendix B of the Rule. Final Rule § ____.20(c)(3), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97
(Jan. 31, 2014); see also Final Rule Appendix B, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5800–04 (Jan. 31, 2014)
(detailing the additional minimum standards for an enhanced internal compliance program);
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7.
45. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(1), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH
ET AL., supra note 42, at 11.
46. NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 11.
47. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH
ET AL., supra note 42, at 11.
48. NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 11.
49. Id.
50. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(3), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH
ET AL., supra note 42, at 11.
51. NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 11,14.
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is in violation of the Rule.52
Independent testing and auditing, which comprise the fourth
pillar, are periodically required to assess the effectiveness of the entire
compliance program.53 Such audits may be completed by qualified
banking personnel, or by external auditors.54 Any deficiencies found in
the compliance program, or other violations of the Rule, must be
appropriately resolved.55
The fifth pillar, training, requires banking entities to train senior
management and those employees who work at the trading desks.56
Trading desks are the units at the banking entity where “securities or other
financial instruments are purchased or sold.”57 Such training is also
necessary for any additional employees who would benefit from training
on how to ensure that the compliance mechanisms are effectively
implemented and followed.58
Recordkeeping, the sixth pillar, is in many ways one of the most
important requirements.59 This recordkeeping documentation serves to
demonstrate compliance with the Rule.60 Such documentation should be
retained for a minimum of five years and submitted to Regulators upon
their request.61
Banking entities under enhanced requirements have an additional
responsibility that is not required of those entities subject only to the
general compliance requirements.62 The chief executive officers (CEOs)
of those entities under enhanced requirements must, in writing, make

52. Id.
53. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(4), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH
ET AL.,

supra note 42, at 14.
Final Rule § ____.20(b)(4), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014)
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 8.
NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 14; Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17.
Final Rule Appendix A, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797–800 (Jan. 31, 2014) (defining
trading desk as “the smallest discrete unit of organization of a banking entity that purchases
or sells financial instruments for the trading account of the banking entity or an affiliate
thereof.”); Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17.
58. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(5), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH
ET AL., supra note 42, at 14; Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17.
59. See Final Rule § ____.20(b)(6), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014) (noting
that records must be “sufficient to demonstrate compliance”).
60. Id.; NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 14.
61. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(6), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH
ET AL., supra note 42, at 14.
62. Final Rule § ____.20(c), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014).
54.
55.
56.
57.
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annual attestations regarding their institution.63 These CEO attestations
certify that the institution has an appropriate Rule compliance program in
place that also accounts for processes by which to review and modify the
program for continued compliance with the Rule.64
While the pillars of compliance themselves are straightforward,
the standard by which compliance programs are to assess bank activity is
riddled with exceptions.65 The number of exceptions to the prohibited
activities complicates institutions’ ability to clearly determine whether
any improper trades were made.66 Additionally, because the Rule does
not provide any definitive criteria for clearly identifying impermissible
high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies,67 it is unclear how banking
entities are expected to know when their trading activity is potentially in
violation of the Rule. In addition to a lack of a clear standard for
identifying improper activity, the Regulators have even broader
discretion in deciding whether certain activity is a violation of the AntiEvasion Provision.68 This lack of clarity presents the risk that the Rule
and its Anti-Evasion Provision will be inconsistently applied and
enforced.69 However, the reporting requirement under which banking

63. Final Rule Appendix B, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5803 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH ET AL.,
supra note 42, at 14.
64. Final Rule § ____.20(c), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH ET
AL., supra note 42, at 14.
65. See Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17 (“The risk to a firm engaging in exempted
activities are only increased by the fact that the conditions that would cause an otherwise
permitted activity to be impermissible are defined somewhat subjectively.”).
66. Deena Zaidi, The ‘Fine Print’ of the Volcker Rule, THE MARKET MOGUL (Aug. 17,
2015), http://themarketmogul.com/fine-print-volcker-rule/.
67. Final Rule § ____.7(a)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5786–87 (Jan. 31, 2014); see also Kobi
Kastiel, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, THE VOLCKER RULE: A FIRST LOOK
AT
KEY
CHANGES
2
(Dec.
18,
2013),
http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/2013-12-18-the-volcker-rule-a-firstlook-at-key-changes.pdf (acknowledging that the Rule “does not provide any definitive
criteria for identifying those assets or strategies.”).
68. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012) (describing the level of discretion, “reasonable cause,”
given to Regulators for identifying violations of the Anti-Evasion Provision).
69. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (noting that the
Regulators are to “consult and coordinate with each other” to ensure that the Final
Implementing Rules from each Regulator are comparable with one another); see also Deanna
J. Hayes, Will the Volcker Rule’s Complexity Be Its Undoing? U. PA. REG. BLOG (July 22,
2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/07/22/hayes-volcker-rule-complexity/ (pointing out that
the Regulators may have differing approaches for how to handle potential problems with
proprietary trading, given the lack of clearly defined activities, which may lead to potential
conflict amongst the five agencies).
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entities must report a specific set of data to the Regulators, may serve as
an effective tool for the Regulators to better assess how banking entities
are conducting their trading activity and to provide the necessary
guidance, over time, for best identifying violations of the Rule.70
The quantitative metrics reported by banking entities are intended
to enable the Regulators to evaluate whether such reporting measures are
adequate for their process of accurately identifying and differentiating
between appropriate and prohibited trading activity.71 All seven
reporting metrics are to be calculated daily for each trading desk, and for
those banking entities with assets greater than $50 billion, reported
monthly.72 Other banks will only report quarterly.73 When submitting
their final reports to the Regulators, each entity will need to calculate an
aggregated figure based on the metrics collected from each of their
trading desks.74 Such measurements are used to monitor each entity’s
trading activity and subsequently evaluate whether such activities are
consistent with the requirements set forth by the Rule.75 Upon evaluating
the first set of data, Regulators will evaluate what changes, if any, are
required to enhance the metrics reporting requirement and fulfill the
requirement’s purpose of facilitating the distinction between improper
and permissible trading activity.76

70. CHRIS COLLINS ET AL., IMPLEMENTING VOLCKER: WHO SETS THE STANDARDS FOR
COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING? CROSSINGS: THE SAPIENT J. OF TRADING & RISK MGMT. 6–7
(Spring
2014),
http://www.sapient.com/content/dam/sapient/sapientglobalmarkets/pdf/thoughtleadership/SGM_Crossings_Spring2014.pdf; see also MAYER ET AL., supra note 10
(suggesting that the data collected from, and reported by, the banking entities will be useful
for identifying whether violations have occurred).
71. See Final Rule Appendix A (identifying the seven quantitative measures as risk and
position limits and usage; risk factor sensitivities; value-at-risk and stress VaR;
comprehensive profit and loss attribution; inventory turnover; inventory aging; and customerfacing trade ration); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 70, at 6–7.
72. Final Rule Appendix A (defining trading desk as, “the smallest discrete unit of
organization of a banking entity that purchases or sells financial instruments for the trading
account of the banking entity or an affiliate thereof”); see also Ireland & Nathan, supra note
17.
73. Final Rule § ____.20(d)(3), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); COLLINS ET
AL., supra note 70, at 6.
74. Chris Kentouris, The Volcker Rule: Managing the Seven Deadly Metrics, FINOPS
REP. (July 30, 2015), http://finops.co/trading/the-volcker-rule-managing-the-seven-deadlymetrics/.
75. Final Rule Appendix A, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797–5800 (Jan. 31, 2014).
76. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 70, at 6–7.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ANTI-EVASION PROVISION
Although the Rule as a whole is problematic,77 one of the biggest
concerns is that the vague distinction between permissible activities and
proprietary trading will lead to inconsistent application of the Rule.78
This lack of clarity may result in conflicts of interest amongst these
agencies79 as well as present a further challenge to the banking entities as
they establish appropriate protocols to safeguard themselves from
accusations of violating the Rule.80
Specifically, the Anti-Evasion Provision, which grants the
Regulators authority to disallow permitted activities that “function as an
evasion” of the Rule, does not provide a clear definition of, or guidelines
for, what actually constitutes an evasion.81 Additionally, the “reasonable
cause”82 standard is ambiguous and grants the Regulators extensive
discretionary power in determining whether impermissible, functionally
evasive activity has occurred.83 Lastly, the absence of bright-line rules
as to how the Regulators will identify and enforce violations of the AntiEvasion Provision reflects the potential for conflict amongst the
Regulators caused by differing interpretations of the Provision.84

77. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 6 (acknowledging that the final
regulations present numerous interpretive and implementation challenges); see also Zaidi,
supra note 66 (highlighting the ambiguous language, unclear definitions, and challenges of
having numerous exceptions to the limits on proprietary trading).
78. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that the Rule does not
have any way for the banking entities to seek “coordinated guidance” from the Regulators,
and indicating that there was uncertainty as to how the Regulators would coordinate with one
another as to matters of Rule interpretation and implementation).
79. Zaidi, supra note 66.
80. See id. (stating that the numerous requirements of the rule, and the exceptions, have
made the implementation process more complex, and that the banks’ task to “make this fine
distinction between core banking functions and proprietary trading every single day” could
be both troublesome and costly).
81. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
82. Id.
83. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (noting that “. . . it needs to only be a ‘reasonable
belief,’ which can provide for a wide spectrum of interpretation when a Regulatory Agency
is scrutinizing an investment or activity.”).
84. See Zaidi, supra note 66 (making note that amongst the Regulators there is a “high
probability of inconsistency and lack of coordination that could result in conflict of interests”).
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Identifying Evasion

The Regulators must establish how they will determine whether
a banking entity has, in fact, evaded the Rule, and even more importantly,
how they will identify whether the alleged evasions were intentional or
accidental.85 Because there are many exceptions to the ban on proprietary
trading, along with additional Prudential Backstops limiting the
exceptions, it is unclear how banking entities can maintain appropriate
controls to avoid accidental evasion of the Rule.86
The Anti-Evasion Provision allocates to Regulators the authority
to take action where there is “reasonable cause to believe”87 that a
banking entity has engaged in an activity that “functions as an evasion of
the requirements” of the Rule.88 Based on the wording of the AntiEvasion Provision, it is unclear what “functions as an evasion” actually
means.89 Black’s Law Dictionary defines evasion as “a subtle
endeavoring to set aside truth or to escape the punishment of law.”90 The
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines evasion as “the act of avoiding
something that you do not want to do or deal with or, a statement or action
that avoids directly dealing with something.”91 Based on both dictionary
definitions, the word “evasion” implies that a person consciously and
purposefully intends to avoid something.92 By adding, “functions as an
evasion,” the language of the Anti-Evasion Provision appears to
encompass all activity that results in evasion, regardless of intent.93
Failure to specify in the Anti-Evasion Provision whether evasive
activities arise only out of gross negligence or a willful intent to violate
85. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2. While the Provision as it stands holds banking
entities accountable for both intentional and accidental “evasions,” being able to properly
identify the banking entity’s intent, or lack thereof, may assist Regulators with determining a
“fair” penalty, as well as help banking entities establish adequate defenses to their alleged
offenses. See id. (noting that the offensive activity “only needs to function like an evasion, or
otherwise violate the Volcker Rule”) (emphasis added).
86. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2) (2012) (listing the limitations on the
permitted activities); MAYER ET AL., supra note 10.
87. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Evasion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/evasion/ (last
visited Oct. 28, 2015).
91. Evasion,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/evasion (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
92. BLACK’S, supra note 90; MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 91.
93. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
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the Rule means that banking entities are subject to penalty even for
accidental violations.94
Identifying evasion then, perhaps rests on whether the questioned
activity has triggered the Prudential Backstops.95 Additionally, banking
entities may intentionally try to evade the Rule’s prohibition on
proprietary trading and covered fund activities “by shifting activity and
investments to subsidiaries,”96 which will be important to examine when
evaluating whether enforcement action should be taken. The ambiguous
nature of the Anti-Evasion Provision’s “functions as an evasion”
language, leaves unanswered the questions of what exactly the Regulators
are looking for and what consequences banking entities will face when,
despite good faith efforts to comply, their trading activity nonetheless
violates the Rule.97
B.

What is “Reasonable Cause?”

As written, the Anti-Evasion Provision only requires that
Regulators have “reasonable cause” in order to allege that there was a
violation.98
Neither the Anti-Evasion Provision, nor the Final
Implementing Rules, however, provide any additional guidance as to
what specific activity would warrant a Regulator’s nullification of that
entity’s investment activity. 99 This poses a significant problem for
banking entities that need the certainty of knowing in advance what
activities may subject them to regulatory action100 for violating the Anti-

94. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (articulating that a banking entity likely does not
need to have intended to evade the Provision in order to be held liable).
95. See Final Rule § ____.7, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5786–87 (Jan. 31, 2014) (laying out the
exceptions to the exemptions from the prohibitions of the Rule); see also SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 118 (noting that these overriding limitations are referred
by the Regulators as “prudential backstops”).
96. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2.
97. See id. at 1 (noting that “in the absence of further clarification or precedent, the antievasion provision raises significant interpretative challenges for industry participants and
practitioners.”).
98. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79
Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
99. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79
Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
100. See Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that
banking entities themselves must also, upon “discovery” of a potential violation, “promptly
terminate the activity and, as relevant, dispose of the investment.”).
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Evasion Provision.101 The “reasonable cause” standard does not appear
to be a particularly difficult threshold to reach.102 Because the Regulators
can broadly interpret “reasonable,” The Anti-Evasion Provision affords
the Regulators a great deal of interpretative power to decide what trading
practices and activities are evasions of the Rule. 103 The Rule does not
specify the grounds on which a regulator would have “reasonable cause”
to believe that proprietary trading activity had occurred, which also
leaves banking entities in the dark as to the circumstances under which
their trading activity may be held to be evasive.104
With such an extensive range of discretion embedded in the
“reasonable cause” standard, the Regulators when scrutinizing an entity’s
activity, may have differing interpretations of what activity is
impermissible.105 Additionally, the statute explicitly mandates an
affirmative duty of banking entities to self-report any violations of the
Rule “upon discovery,”106 which places the banking entities in murky
territory with respect to recognizing when they may have evaded the
Rule. Without a clear understanding of the criteria that Regulators will
use to identify violations, banking entities may not be able to adequately
fulfill their duty to self-report violations.
The ambiguous Anti-Evasion Provision results in uncertainty as
to how the Regulators will justify legal action based on “reasonable
cause,”107 whether the Regulators will make joint decisions with regard
to interpretative issues, and how significant challenges to the
interpretation of the Provision will be resolved.108
C.

Enforcement Concerns

The Anti-Evasion Provision provides that the Regulators’ antievasion enforcement authority is in addition to their already established

101. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2.
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id. (noting that “reasonable belief . . . can provide for a wide spectrum of

interpretation when a Regulatory Agency is scrutinizing an investment or activity.”).
104. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
105. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2.
106. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); Final Rule § ___.21(a), 79 Fed.
Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
107. Final Rule § ___.21(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
108. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 18.

2016]

VOLCKER RULE: ANTI-EVASION

399

enforcement authorities.109 Banking entities may be subject to criminal
and civil penalties by multiple regulators, since the Anti-Evasion
Provision does not set forth a standard penalty for all Regulators.110 As
a result, banking entities may face both increased monetary fines and
administrative action.111 The Anti-Evasion Provision states that it
provides the Regulators with anti-evasion enforcement authority—
though this grant of authority is not clearly defined—which, includes a
new power to nullify trading or investment activities, and to force a
banking entity to stop proprietary trading, provided that the Regulator has
“reasonable cause” to believe that the entity engaged in activity that
functioned as an evasion.112 The Anti-Evasion Provision also relies on
the fact that each of the Regulators has their own enforcement
capabilities.113 Because the Rule is predominantly a banking rule, the
SEC and CFTC have the least power and responsibility to enforce the
Rule.114 However, many institutions are subject to regulation by several
of the five Regulators.115
109. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); Memorandum, Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett LLP, The Volcker Rule And Private Funds: Final Regulations Are Out 17 (Dec.
16,
2013),
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existingcontent/publications/pub1672.pdf.
110. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. MKT EVOLUTION: Who Will Enforce The Volcker Rule,
And
How?
(July
23,
2015),
http://csfme.org/News/TabId/120/ArtMID/983/ArticleID/306/Who-Will-Enforce-theVolcker-Rule-and-How.aspx.
111. CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N., Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z 4–5 (2015),
http://training.cuna.org/self_study/regtrac/member_regtrac/download/M4_SEC1.pdf.
112. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1; MILBANK, CLIENT ALERT: OUT OF THE FRYINGPAN INTO THE FIRE: ENFORCEMENT OF THE VOLCKER RULE BY THE FIVE AGENCIES 2–3 (July
21, 2015), http://www.milbank.com/images/content/2/1/21066/Out-of-the-Frying-Pan.pdf.
113. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. MKT. EVOLUTION, supra note 110.
114. See id. (pointing out that while many financial institutions have functions that are
overseen by the SEC and CFTC, the fact that their Volcker regulations are in accordance with
the BHC Act, these agencies may not be able to use the enforcement methods to which they
are accustomed, when enforcing the Rule); see also GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP, PUB’N:
THE
FINAL
VOLCKER
RULE
2
(Dec.
13,
2013),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/TheFinalVolckerRule.pdf (indicating
that differing Agency enforcement approaches may present challenges to those banking
entities that in addition to bank regulators, are also subject to “activities-based supervision”
such as swap dealing).
115. See Henry Engler, Volcker Rule Enforcement: Regulators Attempt a United Front
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2014/02/19/volckerrule-enforcement-regulators-attempt-a-united-front/ (providing examples of where a banking
entity may be regulated by more than one agency; for instance the article notes that where a
derivative transaction originates within the “banking” side of the firm, but then hedges with a
broker-dealer, both the OCC and SEC may intervene to evaluate whether the activity was
proprietary or not).
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For violations of the Anti-Evasion Provision, in addition to being
permitted to mandate termination of the questionable trading and
investment activity, each of the Regulators can rely on its existing
powers, including imposing hefty monetary penalties for violations of
any law or regulation.116 The potential conflict between the Regulators
arises when multiple Regulators,117 all of whom could impose penalties
in the event of an alleged evasion of the Rule, have some authority over
a single institution.118 Without any bright-line rules as to what activities
fall into the exceptions granted to the ban on proprietary trading, the
Regulators may differ in their interpretation of improper activity and
disputes may arise.119 Given the potential double liability, there is a risk
that banking entities may also try to shift their investment and trading
activity to other entities that are not subject to the Rule’s regulations,
namely the shadow banking system, which is unregulated.120
If claims for violating the Anti-Evasion Provision are brought
against them, another necessary consideration for banking entities is the
most effective way in which they can prove to the Regulators that their
activity complies with the Rule.121 It is important for banking entities to
both analyze how investment activity will most appropriately be tracked
and assess how adequate records will be best maintained—this will make
sure that all trading activity is within the boundaries set by the Prudential
Backstops and the Rule.122 Strict adherence to the compliance program

116. Peter J. Henning, Don’t Expect Eye-Popping Fines for Volcker Rule Violations, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/dont-expect-eye-poppingfines-for-volcker-rule-violations/?_r=0.
117. See Engler, supra note 115 (providing examples of where a banking entity may be
regulated by more than one agency; for instance, the article notes that where a derivative
transaction originates within the “banking” side of the firm, but then hedges with a brokerdealer, both the OCC and SEC may intervene to evaluate whether the activity was proprietary
or not).
118. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. MKT. EVOLUTION, supra note 110.
119. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2; see also GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER, supra note
114, at 2 (indicating that “Because the Final Rule’s distinction between permitted and
prohibited proprietary trading activities is so principles-based . . . [it] may give rise to widely
differing Agency enforcement approaches.”).
120. See Much Ado About Trading, THE ECONOMIST (July 25, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21659671-next-great-regulationtame-banks-now-place-much-ado-about-trading (referring to the shadow banking system, to
which trading may be shifted since that sector is unregulated).
121. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 3.
122. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 8–9 (describing that for banking entities
with more than $50 billion, reporting will be done every month while all other entities will
report quarterly. All banking entities will need to submit documentation that confirms that
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requirements will likely allow banking entities to present to Regulators
investment activity tracking information as well as identify those
individuals responsible for monitoring trading activity and documenting
all compliance measures.123
IV. GUIDANCE FOR REFORMING AND CLARIFYING THE ANTI-EVASION
PROVISION
Preserving the safety and soundness of banks lies at the heart of
all banking regulations.124 Risk management is facilitated through the
use of internal controls and compliance measures such as the ones
mandated in the Final Implementing Rules.125 There is an expectation
that banking entities refrain from engaging in activity that will be
disruptive to the financial stability of the United States.126 In order to
limit any such disruption, the Anti-Evasion Provision gives Regulators
broad discretion to invalidate and terminate any activity that by
“reasonable cause”127 is deemed an evasion of the Rule’s prohibited
activities.128 The Rule details what internal compliance program
requirements are necessary to avoid violating the Rule’s prohibitions,129
but it does not provide specific guidelines that outline exactly what
activities are prohibited and the manner in which Regulators can
appropriately enforce the Anti-Evasion Provision.130
As the Rule’s effectiveness is evaluated, policymakers may
consider providing a higher standard than “reasonable cause” by which
Regulators enforce the Anti-Evasion Provision.131 Imposing a higher

each sponsored fund is not actually a covered fund—detailed records must be maintained for
at least five years to demonstrate compliance with the Rule).
123. Final Rule § ____.20(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); ARNOLD &
PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 8–9.
124. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
125. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7–9 (overviewing the various risk
management tools to be implemented by the banking entities).
126. Final Rule § ___.7, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5786–87 (Jan. 31, 2014).
127. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014); MAYER ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 2.
128. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014); MAYER ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 2.
129. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
130. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2.
131. See id. at 2 (indicating that the current standard “to support a regulatory enforcement
is not high.”).
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standard would require a statutory change; however, it would help to
reduce the amount of discretion allowed to Regulators for determining
whether a banking entity’s trading activity “functions as an evasion” and
thus, provide more uniformity across Regulators with respect to Rule and
Anti-Evasion Provision enforcement.132 Additionally, policymakers may
benefit from analyzing TILA’s Regulation Z and utilizing the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) for guidance on how to best reform
the Rule for enhanced compliance.133
A.

Learning From TILA’s Regulation Z

A close look at other anti-evasion provisions such as Regulation
Z,134 the implementing regulation of TILA, 135 may prove useful when
considering how the Anti-Evasion Provision may be improved. For
instance, revisions to the Provision may include adopting a “safe harbor”
provision similar to that contained in Regulation Z. 136
The primary function of TILA is to promote the informed use of
consumer credit—in order to do so, certain disclosures must be made to
inform consumers about the costs associated with borrowing.137 Like the
Rule, where the type of compliance measures required depend on the size
of the entity,138 Regulation Z is formatted such that the specific rules by
which creditors must abide, depend on the type of credit (open-end or
closed-end) being offered.139 With respect to high-cost mortgage
loans,140 Regulation Z’s anti-evasion provision provides that where credit
132. See id. (making clear that there will be “a wide spectrum of interpretation when a
Regulatory Agency is scrutinizing an investment or activity.”).
133. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Frequently Asked
Questions: What is the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and What Does It Do?
(2015)
[hereinafter
FSOC],
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx.
134. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2016).
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f.
136. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §226.36(e)(2)–(4) (2016) (detailing the “safe harbor,” or
presumption of compliance, on which loan originators may rely provided certain conditions
are met); MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
137. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, TILA 5 (June
2013)
[hereinafter
CFPB
CONSUMER
LAWS],
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-and-regulations_tila-combined-june2013.pdf.
138. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7.
139. CFPB CONSUMER LAWS, supra note 137, at 3.
140. See Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024, 1026 (2016) (defining “high-cost
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is secured by a consumer’s principal dwelling, which does not meet the
definition of open-end credit as defined in § 226.2 of TILA, a creditor
may not attempt to evade the requirements by structuring a home-secured
loan as an open-end plan.141 The provision provides a clear structure for
what will be considered an evasion; this not only better guides consumers
with their decision-making, but also it assists the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) in exercising its enforcement authority.142
In fact, the Fed commented that Regulation Z’s anti-evasion provision
was meant to reach those instances where a creditor had “no reasonable
expectation that the substance of the transaction warranted its form,”
which implies that the totality of the circumstances must be assessed, as
opposed to simply relying on what a particular trading activity or
investment is called.143 Although both Regulation Z and the Rule’s AntiEvasion Provision require an interpretation of what is reasonable, the
standard of Regulation Z is “different, and arguably higher, than the
Volcker Rule’s anti-evasion provision.”144
The Anti-Evasion Provision currently does not set forth clear
criteria as to how evasion is to be defined or assessed.145 Rather, the AntiEvasion Provision merely describes the Regulators’ ability to intervene
for any activity which functions as an evasion or otherwise violates the
restrictions set forth in the Rule.146 TILA, however, includes both
criminal and civil liability provisions that account exclusively for willful
violations of the requirements set out in TILA. 147 Willful violations
under TILA’s criminal liability provisions could result in fines up to
mortgage loans” as home-equity mortgage loans with high interest rates or high fees).
141. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(4) (2016).
142. THE FEDERAL RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK: REGULATION Z: TRUTH
IN
LENDING
ACT
2
(Nov.
2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/til.pdf [hereinafter Consumer
Compliance Handbook]. The Dodd-Frank Act amended TILA and also granted rulemaking
authority to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Id.
143. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 (stating that “Anti-evasion provisions have the
common foundation allowing enforcement agencies to be able to make a substance-over-form
determination”); see also ALSTON & BIRD, TAX BLOG: SUBSTANCE OVER FORM? (Sept. 28,
2011), http://www.alstontax.com/substance-over-form/ (describing the “substance over
form” doctrine as a way to say that some ‘facts’ that are relevant for tax purposes are mostly
controlled by common law fact finding and not labels).
144. See MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
145. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
146. Id.
147. CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N., supra note 111.
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$5,000 and/or imprisonment for up to one year, whereas in a civil suit,
creditors may be required to pay monetary damages and restitution.148
These provisions clearly demarcate the types of acts that would warrant
criminal or civil liability; such specificity is a practical tool to inform
creditors of the ways in which they may be held liable.149
As previously discussed, courts are not inclined to hold a creditor
liable for damages where the defendant has shown a sincere, good faith,
effort to comply with TILA.150 Similarly detailed criminal and civil
liability provisions would be a positive addition to the Anti-Evasion
Provision, and would be advantageous to both the Regulators and
banking entities. These provisions would clarify the circumstances under
which a banking entity may be required to pay a fine in addition to being
ordered to cease and desist from any prohibited activity. 151
Additionally, an important section of Regulation Z that prohibits
steering,152 outlines a review process by which transactions will be
evaluated to see whether they are “in the consumer’s interest.”153
Transactions are compared to all other possible loan offers available to
that consumer by the same loan originator at that time.154 As it can be

148. See CFPB CONSUMER LAWS, supra note 137, at 40 (noting that enforcement agencies
may order restitution when disclosure errors to consumers result from a clear and consistent
pattern of violations, gross negligence, or a willful violation that was intended to mislead the
person to whom the credit was extended).
149. Id. at 39–40.
150. Welmaker v. WT Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (holding that the
defendant did not intentionally violate TILA as he had made good faith efforts to comply with
the Act); see Consumer Compliance Handbook, supra note 119, at 4 (“Good faith compliance
with the commentary protects creditors from civil liability under TILA.”); CREDIT UNION
NAT’L ASS’N, supra note 111.
151. See Final Rule § ___.21(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that the
Regulators “may take any action permitted by law to enforce compliance . . . including
directing the banking entity to restrict, limit, or terminate any or all activities under this part
and dispose of any investment.”) (emphasis added). Currently, the lack of bright-line rules
makes it difficult for banking entities to not only ascertain under what circumstances they
may be held in violation of the Anti-Evasion Provision, but also the specific penalties to which
they may be subject. Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
152. See MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, CLIENT ALERT: FINAL RULE GOVERNING LOAN
ORIGINATOR COMPENSATION PRACTICES 8 (Aug. 31, 2010) [hereinafter MORRISON &
FOERSTER,
LOAN
ORIGINATOR],
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/100831FinalRule.pdf (defining steering as,
“advising, counseling, or otherwise influencing a consumer to accept a particular
transaction.”).
153. Id. at 9.
154. Id.

2016]

VOLCKER RULE: ANTI-EVASION

405

difficult to determine whether a transaction will be helpful or detrimental
to the consumer’s interest, loan originators are encouraged to utilize the
safe harbor provided by Regulation Z.155 This safe harbor essentially
recognizes three different types of transactions which would safeguard
the loan originator from enforcement action.156 So long as the transaction
information is presented according to the criteria stated in the provision,
along with the loan originator’s “good faith belief”157 that the loan options
presented are those for which the consumer actually qualifies, the loan
originator will be protected.158
Like Regulation Z’s prohibition against steering, the Rule’s
Prudential Backstops address the types of activities that will be
considered violations of the Rule, such as anything that creates conflicts
of interests with clients or results in “material exposures to high-risk
assets.”159 As previously highlighted, there is a great amount of
ambiguity surrounding how such conflicts and “material exposures” are
to be determined both by the banking entities as they engage in such
activity, and for the Regulators in terms of how they enforce the AntiEvasion Provision.160 Lack of clarity regarding the definition of evasive
activity161 may indicate that a safe harbor provision like that in Regulation
Z162 would be appropriate for the Rule.
Compliance is presumed if transactions fall within the safe harbor
in Regulation Z.163 Likewise, a safe harbor provision for the Rule might
outline specific activities or categories of activities that are in the best
interest of the consumer and do not pose a risk to the financial stability
of the United States and thus, are compliant with the Prudential

155. Regulation Z,12 C.F.R. §226.36(e)(2)–(4) (2016); MORRISON & FOERSTER, LOAN
ORIGINATOR, supra note 152, at 10–11.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2)(A) (2012); see also GOELZER, supra note 12.
160. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
161. Id.; see also Zaidi, supra note 66 (emphasizing that there are a “lack of clear
distinctive activities.”).
162. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §226.36(e)(2)–(4) (2016); see also MORRISON & FOERSTER,
LOAN ORIGINATOR, supra note 152, at 10 (describing the types of transactions falling within
the safe harbor).
163. THE FEDERAL RESERVE: COMPLIANCE GUIDE TO SMALL ENTITIES, REGULATION Z:
LOAN ORIGINATOR COMPENSATION AND STEERING, (Aug. 2, 2013) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL
RESERVE], http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/regzcg.htm.
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Backstops.164 Such detailed information may also include extremely
precise metric measuring, reporting, and assessment methods—if a
banking entity can show that they in good faith implemented the stated
methods, their activity can fall within the safe harbor. Specific criteria,
which directly outline what is and is not permissible, will provide banking
entities an effective system by which to assess their compliance and allow
the safe harbor to be met.165 As in Regulation Z, a good faith clause
would be advisable so as to minimize the claims brought against banking
entities for unintentional evasive activity since “prohibited activities . . .
are in some cases extremely difficult to distinguish from permitted
activities.”166
Although the notion of good faith is not explicitly stated in the
Anti-Evasion Provision, the strict requirements that mandate internal
controls such as verification and documentation of all activity, reporting
of metrics, and comprehensive training regarding compliance, are all
intended to prevent evasion, as these measures “help monitor potential
evasions of the prohibitions and restrictions” of the Rule.167 The
substance-over-form doctrine that lies at the core of all anti-evasion
provisions168 will mean that any claims made against a banking entity will
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, utilizing all of the facts and
circumstances presented regarding the nature of the offending activity.169
Similar to how loan originators must demonstrate that their loan
transactions adhere to the criteria set forth in Regulation Z’s safe harbor
section, the Regulators could examine the entity’s adherence to the Rule’s
internal monitoring and reporting requirements to assess whether the
entity in good faith attempted to comply with the Anti-Evasion
Provision.170 Banking entities can be required to present comprehensive
164.
165.
166.
167.

Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2)(A); GOELZER, supra note 12.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 163.
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 3.
MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2; David H. Carpenter and M. Maureen Murphy, The
Volcker Rule: A Legal Analysis, Congressional Research Service, R43340 Summary (Mar.
27, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43440.pdf.
168. See MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 (stating that “Anti-evasion provisions have the
common foundation allowing enforcement agencies to be able to make a substance-over-form
determination.”).
169. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2.
170. PWC LLP, FS REGULATORY BRIEF: THE VOLCKER RULE: HOW MUCH FAITH IS GOOD
FAITH?
(2012),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatoryservices/publications/assets/pwc-volcker-rule-food-faith-compliance.pdf
(illustrating
examples of tangible actions that banking entities may use to demonstrate “good faith”).
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documentation, or “business justification,” demonstrating that their
activity was within the scope of permissible activity. 171 Given that
banking entities are already expected to maintain adequate records for
five years, presenting such justification to show good faith compliance
with the Rule could help to eliminate unnecessary enforcement action for
activity that was in no way meant to evade the Rule’s requirements.172
B.

Utilizing FSOC

The Regulators have the ultimate authority for interpreting which
activity is impermissible or evasive. 173 Where there is uncertainty and
lack of clarity, the Regulators may benefit from having a mediator assist
with interpretation and help to streamline the enforcement process so as
not to be unfair or inconsistent.174 FSOC, which is responsible for
identifying risks to the financial stability of the United States and
responding to such threats to financial stability, may be in the best
position to serve as mediator.175 Another possible mediator could be the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”), an
interagency body that has the authority to establish “uniform principles,
standards, and report forms” for examining financial institutions by the
FRB, FDIC, OCC, CFPB, and the National Credit Union
Administration.176 The FFIEC can also make recommendations that
would provide more uniformity in the supervision of financial
institutions.177 In theory, FFIEC appears to have vested in it the power to
provide the uniformity for enforcement amongst Regulators that the AntiEvasion Provision currently lacks. However, because the FFIEC does

171. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
172. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(6), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); see also

ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 8–9 (highlighting that entities will need to submit
documentation that confirms that each sponsored fund is not actually a covered fund, and
noting that detailed records must be maintained for at least five years to demonstrate
compliance with The Rule).
173. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); MAYER ET
AL., supra note 10, at 2.
174. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 17–18 (outlining some concerns
with respect to coordination between Regulators—one of them being, to whom the regulators
will direct any interpretative questions).
175. FSOC, supra note 133.
176. FFIEC: FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, About the FFIEC: Mission,
http://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm.
177. Id.
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not include the SEC, which is also a critical player in the Final
Implementing Rules and the Anti-Evasion Provision, utilizing the FFIEC
as a mediator may not adequately resolve the existing enforcement
inconsistencies.178
As a mediator, FSOC could step in to clarify best practices for the
banking entities to ensure that their activity is not at risk of being
considered an evasion of the Rule, as well as to provide additional and
stricter standards to the Regulators to aid with enforcement.179 Without
more consistency, banking entities may face dual action from the various
Regulators.180 While the Regulators acknowledge that a banking entity
may at times be subject to multiple Regulators’ authority, they have
repeatedly “rejected the idea of having a lead enforcer or interpreter of
the Volcker Rule regulations” and instead, have opted to “coordinate their
activities” in an effort to “limit duplicative actions and undue costs and
burdens.”181 Such duplicative administrative action and civil money
penalties will inevitably pose an undue cost and burden on U.S. financial
institutions, which could lead to financial distress and present the type of
risk to the financial stability of the United States that FSOC ultimately
seeks to prevent.182
Given that the Regulators may differ in their application of
“reasonable cause”183 when identifying evasive activity, it may also be
advisable to designate an interpretative mediator. FSOC, which
conducted a 2011 study184 regarding the Rule’s implementation, may be

178. Id.
179. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §

112, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012) (laying out the FSOC’s charge to identify risks to the financial
stability of the United States).
180. Whitehead, supra note 19.
181. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
182. Whitehead, supra note 19.
183. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014); MAYER ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 4.
184. See generally FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUND &
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS (Jan. 2011), www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.; see also
SHEARMAN & STERLING, CLIENT PUBLICATION: FSOC STUDY ON IMPLEMENTING THE VOLCKER
RULE—A SERIES OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AND SOME SURPRISES (Jan. 2011),
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/files/newsinsights/publications/2011/01/fsoc-study-onimplementing-the-volcker-rule—a-s__/files/view-full-memo-fsoc-study-on-implementingthe-vo__/fileattachment/fia012411fsocstudyonimplementingthevolckerrule.pdf
(summarizing and reviewing the FSOC study’s recommendations).
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the most appropriate party to serve as an interpreter when the Regulators
are unsure of whether or not a banking entity’s activity goes beyond the
Prudential Backstops. In its initial study, FSOC did not provide any
recommendations as to what steps the Regulators may take to incorporate
the safety and soundness component of the Prudential Backstops into
their regulatory frameworks.185 Without a consistent approach to
regulation and enforcement of the Prudential Backstops, compliance is
more challenging, which may cause a banking entity to run afoul of its
responsibility to engage in safe and sound financial practices.186 Since
Congress has already, within the Rule, granted FSOC the power to
coordinate supervisory activities, FSOC seems to be an optimal solution
to resolving some of the Rule’s ambiguities and the potential
inconsistencies amongst the Regulators.187 If FSOC is unwilling or
unable to serve as an actual intermediary or supervisory authority for the
Regulators, then at the very least, it could use its authority to make
recommendations “to apply new or heightened standards and safeguards
for financial activities or practices.”188
The scope of FSOC’s recommendations would likely depend on
the results of the metric reporting data review.189 Once the Regulators
identify the nature of the trading activity taking place across entities, postconformance, FSOC may be better able to suggest how each institution
can modify its internal practices to monitor for prohibited trading activity.
Similarly, once the data has been compiled and reviewed, FSOC may also
be able to provide guidance to the Regulators on ways to alter the metric
reporting requirements to ease their enforcement burden while still
maintaining strict compliance with the Rule.190

185. See MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, NEWS BULLETIN: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL
VOLCKER
RULE
STUDY
3
(Feb.
2011),
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110214_Review_of_FSOC_Volcker_Rule_Stu
dy.pdf (stating that the study merely “encourage[d] the Agencies to incorporate the safety and
soundness limitations into the framework and procedures adopted to assure compliance with
the Volcker Rule.”).
186. Ken E Bentsen Jr., Holes in the Volcker Rule, THE HILL (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/199744-holes-in-the-volcker-rule.
187. Id.
188. Norbert J. Michel, The Financial Stability Oversight Council: Helping to Enshrine
“Too Big to Fail,” (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/04/thefinancial-stability-oversight-council-helping-to-enshrine-too-big-to-fail.
189. Supra Part II.
190. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 70, at 6 (indicating that after the metric reporting data
is collected and reviewed, the requirements for such reporting may be adjusted).
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V. CONCLUSION
While the numerous exceptions to the Rule’s ban on proprietary
trading favor banking entities and afford them greater flexibility with
their trading activity than would be feasible under a stricter version of the
Rule,191 these exceptions may be causing more harm than good. The
exceptions, limited by the Prudential Backstops, make it much more
challenging for banking entities and Regulators alike to identify
impermissible or evasive activity. 192 In the interest of consistency and
fairness, the Anti-Evasion Provision should both be reexamined and
amended to include clear guidelines that will allow banking entities to
more efficiently protect themselves from administrative action stemming
from the Anti-Evasion Provision,193
Such amendments to the Anti-Evasion Provision could be
modeled after other anti-evasion provisions and safe harbors, such as
those contained in TILA’s Regulation Z,194 and include a good faith
provision to account for unintentional noncompliance, thereby reducing
burdensome administrative action and costs. Banking entities and
Regulators both would benefit from these suggested modifications to the
Anti-Evasion Provision, and the FSOC’s potential intervention195 where
there was a disagreement amongst the Regulators over how to interpret
and enforce the Anti-Evasion Provision. Such an intervention would help
to ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application of the AntiEvasion Provision.196 Higher standards and clear criteria for what
constitutes “evasion”197 will both enhance banking entities’ ability to
appropriately adhere to the Rule’s requirements and clarify the

191. GOELZER, supra note 12.
192. Whitehead, supra note 19.
193. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)

§ 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012) (demonstrating the lack of bright line rules for when,
under the Anti-Evasion Provision, Regulators can bring enforcement action against a banking
entity). Clearer guidelines are critical to clarify the circumstances under which the Regulators
may bring enforcement action against a banking entity for any violations of the Rule as they
relate to proprietary trading or covered funds. Id.
194. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R § 226 (2016); MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
195. Supra Part IV.
196. Supra Part IV.
197. Supra Part III.
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Regulators’ enforcement efforts, rendering the Rule’s implementation
much more effective.
VINITA TANDON

